The Turkish government under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been ramping up its efforts to expand its ideological and political influence abroad through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, or Diyanet. A recently unveiled strategic plan for 2024-2028 by Nordic Monitor lays out a bold target: reaching nearly 12 million people overseas, primarily in Europe and North America, by utilizing a network of mosques and religious venues under Turkish control. The Diyanet, which had previously reached 1.9 million people by the end of its last strategic term, aims to increase this number to 11.9 million by 2028. This ambitious outreach strategy raises questions about the nature of Turkey’s foreign religious operations and their implications for host countries.
Diyanet’s new strategic plan outlines specific goals, recommended tactics, and solutions to address existing shortcomings in its outreach efforts. Mosques, which serve as primary platforms for the dissemination of religious and cultural messages, remain at the heart of these operations. These mosques are staffed by Turkish imams deployed overseas and funded by Turkish taxpayers. Special venues that offer religious courses are also being used to extend the Diyanet’s reach. The plan recommends improvements, including better compensation packages for staff, recruitment of more qualified personnel, and collaborations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to strengthen the operational capacity of religious institutions abroad.
The Diyanet’s foreign operations are locally managed by religious attachés and counselors stationed at Turkish embassies, who operate with diplomatic immunity. These officials report directly to the Directorate General of Foreign Affairs, one of the Diyanet’s three key branches. This structure allows the Diyanet to execute its outreach mission under close supervision and coordination with the Turkish government.
The plan highlights challenges in retaining personnel abroad, with salary issues at the forefront. The current compensation has not been sufficient to retain employees, especially those who are nationals or permanent residents of host countries. Notably, over 100 staff members resigned following an October 2022 pay raise deemed inadequate. To address this, the plan suggests amending Law No. 633, which governs the Diyanet, to enable better salary packages for contract employees. The strategic plan underscores that addressing compensation issues is vital for maintaining the stability and effectiveness of the Diyanet’s foreign operations.
In addition to mosque-based outreach, the Erdogan administration has directed the Diyanet to collaborate more closely with NGOs established by Turkey abroad. These organizations, while ostensibly engaged in cultural and social activities, are being encouraged to align with the political objectives of the Turkish government. By infusing religious motivations into NGO activities, the Erdogan administration aims to leverage these organizations for political gains in foreign countries. This approach marks a significant step in using ‘cultural diplomacy’ as a tool for projecting soft power, which in reality may serve as a conduit for advancing Turkey’s geopolitical interests.
The plan also calls for enhancing the administrative and technical capacities of personnel assigned to foreign missions, along with increasing the financial support provided to organizations engaged in this cultural diplomacy. This aligns with Turkey’s broader foreign policy agenda of utilizing religious and cultural institutions as instruments of statecraft.
The involvement of Turkish intelligence (MIT) in the Diyanet’s overseas activities adds a layer of complexity to the organization’s mission. According to reports, MIT operates a covert program using religious workers as cover for its agents in foreign countries. Turkish imams, who are embedded within immigrant communities and have direct access to local organizations and municipalities, are uniquely positioned to gather intelligence and identify potential recruits for Turkish intelligence.
This overlap between religious outreach and intelligence operations enables Turkey to exploit vulnerabilities within immigrant communities and to influence local politics in host countries. The Diyanet’s mandate includes coordinating with Turkish intelligence and other government agencies in the selection, training, and deployment of personnel abroad, further blurring the lines between cultural diplomacy and espionage.
The expansion of Diyanet’s activities, particularly in Europe, North America and Asia has significant implications for host countries. Many nations have already voiced concerns about foreign influence operations targeting their immigrant communities, and Turkey’s strategy appears to play into these fears. The use of mosques and religious institutions as instruments for political influence could create social tensions and may be perceived as an encroachment on the secular principles of host nations.
Moreover, the recruitment of dual citizens or foreign nationals as intelligence assets presents a security challenge. The ability of religious personnel with diplomatic immunity to engage in potentially subversive activities on foreign soil can be seen as a violation of diplomatic norms. Such actions may provoke a backlash and lead to increased scrutiny of Turkish institutions operating abroad.
Under Erdogan’s rule, the Turkish government has significantly expanded its overseas operations, with the Diyanet playing a central role. This has involved recruiting agents and informants not just from Turkish citizens but also from local communities. The strategic plan for 2024-2028 signals a continuation and intensification of this approach, with a clear objective to mold the political landscape in countries with significant Turkish or Muslim populations. The Diyanet’s activities, while framed as religious outreach, may serve broader strategic interests, from shaping diaspora loyalties to gathering intelligence for the state.
The Diyanet’s strategic plan illustrates Turkey’s concerted effort to extend its influence beyond its borders, using religious and cultural institutions as tools of state policy. The blurring of lines between religious outreach, cultural diplomacy, and intelligence operations raises critical questions about the true nature of Turkey’s activities abroad. For host countries, the challenge will be to navigate the fine line between fostering multiculturalism and preventing foreign interference, as Turkey continues to push its influence campaign through a well-coordinated, state-backed religious apparatus.
