In recent years, there has been increasing concern over China’s covert operations in India, particularly through the use of social media. These operations aim to influence public opinion, sow discord, and gather intelligence, posing significant challenges to India’s national security.
In the complex landscape of global geopolitics and social media, covert influence operations have emerged as potent tools for state and non-state actors to shape public opinion, spread propaganda, and influence elections. Recent reports from OpenAI and Meta have highlighted significant disruptions in such activities, shedding light on the sophisticated nature of these operations and their far-reaching impacts.
OpenAI’s report, “AI and Covert Influence Operations: Latest Trends,” detailed the disruption of activities by an Israeli commercial company, STOIC. STOIC was implicated in generating content related to sensitive geopolitical events, including the Gaza conflict and Indian elections.
Initially, STOIC’s operations targeted audiences in Canada, the US, and Israel, producing content in English and Hebrew. However, in early May, the company’s focus shifted to India. The operation began generating English-language web articles and social media comments that were critical of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and supportive of the opposition Congress Party. OpenAI reported that it disrupted some of STOIC’s activities within 24 hours of their commencement, demonstrating the capability of advanced AI systems to identify and counteract covert influence operations swiftly.
Simultaneously, Meta’s “Adversarial Threat Report” revealed the removal of multiple accounts linked to a network originating in China. This network was engaged in promoting Khalistani propaganda, targeting the global Sikh community across several countries, including Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, the UK, and Nigeria.
Meta identified and removed “37 Facebook accounts, 13 Pages, five Groups, and nine accounts on Instagram” for coordinated inauthentic behavior. These accounts used both compromised and fake identities to pose as Sikhs, manage Pages and Groups, and post content that appeared to support a fictitious activist movement called Operation K. This movement called for pro-Sikh protests in countries such as New Zealand and Australia, attempting to galvanize global support for Khalistani separatism.
The disruption of these covert operations by OpenAI and Meta underscores several key points about the current state of influence operations and the challenges they pose:
The operations by STOIC and the China-based network were sophisticated, leveraging compromised accounts, fake identities, and automated systems to amplify their messages. The targeting of multiple countries and communities highlights the global reach and ambition of these campaigns.
Both operations exploited politically sensitive issues to manipulate public opinion. STOIC’s focus on the Indian elections and the China-based network’s promotion of Khalistani propaganda aimed to influence political dynamics and social tensions in the targeted regions.
The ability of OpenAI and Meta to detect and disrupt these operations quickly is a testament to the advancements in AI and cybersecurity. OpenAI’s swift action against STOIC’s activities, within less than 24 hours, and Meta’s comprehensive takedown of the network, indicate significant improvements in the capability to counter covert influence operations.
The targeted audiences across various countries, including Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, the UK, and Nigeria, demonstrate the need for global coordination in addressing these threats. International cooperation and information sharing are crucial in mitigating the impact of such operations.
Chinese operatives create and disseminate false information to mislead and manipulate public opinion. This can include fake news, doctored images, and misleading narratives. Automated bots and fake profiles amplify disinformation and engage in online debates to steer conversations in the desired direction. These accounts often pose as local Indian users to appear authentic. Chinese state-sponsored hackers target social media platforms to gather sensitive information, monitor communications, and identify influential figures in India. China cultivates relationships with local influencers and uses them to subtly promote pro-China narratives and policies. These influencers can range from academics to social media celebrities.
A study by the Stanford Internet Observatory and Graphika in 2020 revealed that China-based networks were responsible for spreading disinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic. These networks targeted multiple countries, including India, to deflect criticism from China and undermine trust in democratic institutions.
For example, during the India-China border clashes in Galwan Valley in 2020, social media platforms saw a surge in fake news and manipulated content designed to provoke anti-government sentiments and create confusion among the Indian populace.
Research by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab identified a significant presence of bots and fake accounts linked to China that were active in Indian social media. These accounts frequently engaged in spreading pro-China propaganda and anti-India narratives.
According to a 2021 report by the cybersecurity firm Cyfirma, over 7,000 Chinese social media accounts were identified as spreading disinformation about India’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and the government’s policies in the region of Jammu and Kashmir.
A 2020 report by Recorded Future, a cybersecurity company, detailed how Chinese state-sponsored hackers had been targeting Indian government officials, military personnel, and journalists through social media platforms. These operations aimed to gather intelligence and monitor communications that could be of strategic importance to China.
The report highlighted that phishing campaigns, often initiated through social media contacts, were a common tactic used by these hackers to infiltrate sensitive networks and databases.
China’s covert operations in India using social media represent a sophisticated and multifaceted threat. Through disinformation campaigns, the use of bots and fake accounts, cyber espionage, and influence operations, China aims to manipulate public opinion, gather intelligence, and destabilize its neighbor. Addressing this challenge requires a comprehensive approach, including enhanced cybersecurity measures, public awareness campaigns, and international cooperation to combat disinformation and protect democratic institutions
