Russia’s diplomatic and economic engagements in the Horn of Africa took center stage last week, with high-profile interactions in Djibouti and Somaliland. A visit by Djibouti’s National Assembly Speaker to Moscow and a trade delegation’s trip to Somaliland signaled Russia’s intent to deepen its footprint in the strategically significant Gulf of Aden-Red Sea (GARS) region. While these developments were framed in terms of trade, logistics, and agriculture, they could have a crucial military dimension, particularly in Russia’s long-standing quest to establish a naval base in the region.
For years, Russia has sought to reestablish a Soviet-era naval presence in the GARS region, eyeing strategic locations along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to secure maritime routes and counter Western influence. The plan to establish a naval base in Sudan has been repeatedly delayed due to the country’s civil war and Western diplomatic pressure. This uncertainty has forced Russia to consider alternative locations, with Djibouti and Somaliland emerging as potential candidates.
Even if the Sudanese base deal eventually materializes, securing a presence in Djibouti or Somaliland could provide a complementary or fallback position for Russia’s naval ambitions. Given the growing geopolitical competition in the region, Russia’s interest in diversifying its military and economic engagements reflects a pragmatic approach to securing its long-term strategic interests.
Djibouti’s Role in Russia’s Strategic Calculations
Djibouti, located at the crucial Bab el-Mandeb Strait linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, is home to multiple foreign military bases, including those of the United States, China, and France. Russia’s engagement with Djibouti could be part of a broader effort to secure a foothold in this geopolitically sensitive area.
A previous analysis from November 2023 suggested that Russia could broker a series of economic and security deals between Djibouti, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, leveraging investments in mining, agriculture, and infrastructure in exchange for a naval base. This strategy could gain traction if former U.S. President Donald Trump returns to office in 2025 and implements the Project 2025 proposal, which includes recognizing Somaliland as a means of countering China’s growing influence in Djibouti.
Should the U.S. shift its military presence from Djibouti to Somaliland, Djibouti would stand to lose a significant source of revenue from leasing its base to the U.S. In such a scenario, Russia could step in as a substitute, either by negotiating its own naval base in Djibouti or by taking over the U.S. facility, similar to how it assumed control of a former U.S. airbase in Niger last year. This would provide Djibouti with a seamless financial transition while allowing Russia to expand its military reach in the region.
However, if the U.S. decides to maintain its base in Djibouti, Russia would likely shift its focus to Somaliland, where recent diplomatic and economic overtures suggest a potential opening.
Somaliland: A New Strategic Ally for Russia?
Somaliland, a self-declared independent state that is not internationally recognized, has long sought global recognition in exchange for strategic partnerships. While Russia maintains cordial relations with Somalia, which claims Somaliland as part of its territory, recent tensions suggest that Moscow might be willing to bypass Somalia’s objections in pursuit of its strategic interests.
Notably, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud criticized Russia twice in January 2024 at a major international conference in Italy. This diplomatic friction might have influenced Russia’s decision to engage directly with Somaliland, sending a delegation led by the Chairman of the Russian Trade Association in Africa to discuss agricultural, industrial, and logistical cooperation.
Although no official reports have confirmed that military agreements were discussed, the visit could be a precursor to deeper ties, potentially leading to formal recognition of Somaliland. If Russia were to recognize Somaliland, it could establish a naval base there in exchange for economic investments and military cooperation, mirroring China’s strategy in Djibouti. This move would not only secure Russia’s naval presence in the GARS region but also challenge Western influence in the Horn of Africa.
U.S. Geopolitical Maneuvers and Russia’s Response
The U.S. has a vested interest in maintaining its presence in Djibouti due to its strategic importance in counterterrorism operations and maritime security. However, if Washington shifts its focus to Somaliland as a countermeasure to China’s growing influence in Djibouti, it could inadvertently create an opportunity for Russia to establish a base in Djibouti or at least increase its economic leverage there.
The potential recognition of Somaliland by the U.S. could also trigger a realignment of alliances in the region. Ethiopia, which has shown interest in gaining access to Somaliland’s Berbera port, might welcome Russian involvement as a counterbalance to Western and Gulf state influences. Similarly, South Sudan, which relies on Djibouti for trade, could align with Russia if economic incentives are offered.
The Strategic Calculations Behind Russia’s Engagement
Russia’s approach in the Horn of Africa reflects a broader pattern of reacting to geopolitical shifts rather than actively shaping them. By engaging with Djibouti and Somaliland, Russia is positioning itself to capitalize on any openings that arise due to shifting U.S. policies, regional disputes, or economic needs.
If Sudan finally implements its naval base agreement with Russia, the urgency to secure an alternative base in Djibouti or Somaliland might decrease, though Russia could still pursue complementary facilities. However, if Sudan’s civil war continues to stall the project, Russia will need to secure a fallback option, making Djibouti and Somaliland even more crucial.
While Russia lacks the economic clout of China or the deep-rooted security partnerships of the U.S. in the region, it has demonstrated adaptability in leveraging economic incentives and diplomatic engagements to expand its influence. Its recent moves in Djibouti and Somaliland suggest a calculated strategy to secure a foothold in the Horn of Africa, regardless of how regional dynamics evolve.
Russia’s recent diplomatic and economic engagements in Djibouti and Somaliland underscore its evolving strategy in the Horn of Africa. As it seeks to reestablish a naval presence in the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea region, Russia is carefully assessing alternatives to its stalled Sudanese base project.
Djibouti presents an opportunity if the U.S. relocates its military presence to Somaliland, while Somaliland itself could emerge as a strategic partner if Russia chooses to recognize it in exchange for military and economic cooperation. Given the fluid geopolitical landscape, Russia’s engagement in the region is less about direct confrontation with the West and more about positioning itself to capitalize on emerging opportunities.
As global power rivalries intensify in the Horn of Africa, Russia’s moves in Djibouti and Somaliland will be closely watched. Whether these engagements result in a permanent naval presence or serve as leverage in broader geopolitical negotiations, one thing is clear: Russia is determined to expand its footprint in one of the world’s most strategically significant maritime regions.
