The wounds of Mumbai 26/11 may have faded from the news cycles, but they continue to bleed in our collective conscience. For most Indians, the narrative is painfully clear – ten Pakistani terrorists infiltrated Mumbai, unleashed horror across the Taj, Trident, Nariman House, CST railway station, and hospitals, leaving 166 dead and hundreds scarred for life. The mastermind was Hafiz Saeed of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). The reconnaissance groundwork was done by David Coleman Headley, an American-Pakistani with one foot in espionage and another in jihad.
That is the story India has been comfortable telling itself, and the world was willing to accept.
But what if that is only part of the truth? What if there was a second shadow walking unnoticed across Mumbai’s landmarks, feeding the same terror architecture that emerged on 26/11? What if he was not Pakistani or American—but Maldivian?
GoaChronicle uncovered what intelligence circles quietly knew but never formally pursued: the Maldivian youth Mohamed Ziliyan, National Identity Number A071311, was LeT’s second reconnaissance agent in India.
Unlike Headley, his name never made headlines. His photographs were never publicly disclosed. His presence was never acknowledged in India’s voluminous 26/11 charge sheets. He melted into silence like a ghost of geopolitics – too inconvenient for diplomacy, too explosive for policy, and too damning for regional partnerships.
David Headley’s trips are well documented. Between 2006 and 2008, he made five extended visits to Mumbai, scouting targets. But the LeT, an organisation notorious for redundancy and operational backup, would never rely on a single operative for a plot of this magnitude.
Enter Mohamed Ziliyan, son of Ahmed Ibrahim. A youth from the Maldives, once briefly on their police “Wanted List” for his suspected role in the 2005 uprising. His escape to Yemen with assistance from his family was the beginning of his radical transformation. In Yemen, he came in contact with LeT operatives. Soon, he found himself in Pakistan, undergoing terror training.
Ziliyan was paid, equipped with a mini-pocket camera, and sent to India. His brief: carry out detailed reconnaissance of Mumbai and Bengaluru locations. Report back by way of photographs, video recordings, and personal observations.
He did exactly that.
His documentation included the Taj, Trident, CST railway station, Nariman House, hospitals, and foreign diplomatic offices—spots that were eventually attacked on 26/11. Those visuals were reportedly crucial during the planning stages.
Unlike Headley, however, Ziliyan benefitted from quiet local cover. His father had friends across various strata in India and fluency in Hindi, Malayalam, Tamil, and Gujarati. Ziliyan himself had studied in Bengaluru for some years, making his movement across Indian cities reasonably unchallenged.
If this were mere speculation or confidential intelligence chatter, one could dismiss it as conjecture. But it was confirmed publicly by none other than the former President of Maldives, Mohammed Nasheed, in an interview with an Indian media house.
When pressed about the radicalisation of Maldivian youth, Nasheed stated:
“Yes, we have a serious issue with Islamist radicals… We believe that the identity of all the dead terrorists in the Mumbai attacks has not been broken down into nationalities. I feel there is a Maldivian connection to the Mumbai attacks. We have information from the families of terrorists who are still in the Maldives about this.”
This revelation should have prompted a re-investigation – or at the very least, a formal inquiry. Instead, it was buried under generosity packages, tourism diplomacy, and the Indian Ocean neighbourliness narrative.
There are uncomfortable explanations:
In 2008-09, India was heavily invested in stabilising political transitions in the Maldives. The island nation sits strategically in the Indian Ocean, a key counterweight to Chinese maritime ambitions. Pushing hard for extradition or acknowledgement of Maldivian involvement in 26/11 would have risked bilateral ties at a critical moment.
And let’s be blunt – in the past India has often traded truth for tactical stability.
26/11 became the defining global case of Pakistani state-sponsored terror. Introducing another nationality would complicate intelligence accessibility, legal frameworks, and international pressure campaigns. The world wanted a clear culprit. Pakistan was it.
Maldives was too small to matter, too delicate to confront, and too useful to risk alienating.
David Headley’s arrest by the US DEA and subsequent intelligence spill became the official closure. He was “the man who did the surveys”. Once categorised, no agency wished to reopen the envelope. Ziliyan was a loose thread that threatened to unravel years of controlled intelligence narratives.
Over 250 Maldivians are believed to have joined extremist organisations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Per capita, it’s one of the highest global contributor nations to jihadist recruitment. Two decades prior, agencies tracked growing influence of Saudi Wahhabi ideology across the islands.
In 2005, Ziliyan was suspected of being part of the uprisings linked to extremism. Yet, he slipped through and was later actively nurtured by LeT. The Indian subcontinent has historically underplayed Maldivian involvement in South Asian extremist networks.
The 26/11 narrative proves this negligence.
Sixteen years later, justice demands that India revisit every thread that led to 26/11 – not for retaliation, but for clarity. An intelligence declassification, cross-referencing of Ziliyan’s travel logs, communication records, and LeT operational hierarchy could highlight complicity beyond Pakistan.
Maldives itself is undergoing an ideological tug-of-war today. Some leaders lean heavily toward radical-friendly narratives. Others, like Nasheed, bravely reveal uncomfortable truths. India must capitalise on the latter.
Because ignoring facts for political convenience is not strategy – it’s silence that strengthens extremists.
This is not about blaming an entire nation. It is about holding an individual operative accountable and understanding the full extent of LeT’s strategy. It is also about closing gaps. Terror outfits rarely operate with singular approaches. India must never be blindsided again.
26/11 was not just an attack on Mumbai. It was an assault on India’s will to live free.
David Headley gave LeT one pair of eyes. Mohamed Ziliyan gave them another. Only one was named. The other is still a shadow.
Until India demands that shadow be brought under light, the story of 26/11 remains incomplete. Incomplete stories lead to repeated tragedies. And repeated tragedies are a nation’s failure, not a terrorist’s success.
The question is no longer “Was there Maldivian involvement?” It is “Why did India avoid looking?”
The answer lies in courage – courage to confront inconvenient truths.
Justice, like sovereignty, cannot have selective vision. And the memory of 166 souls demands honesty. Even if it shakes diplomatic comfort.
