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Analysing Allegations of Indian Army’s Responsibility in Rajiv Gandhi Government’s Sri Lanka Policy Failure 1987-90

Operation Pawan: The Indian Peace Keeping Force’s Intervention in Sri Lanka

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‘There are two skills in which the Indian Army can never hope to win against adept political camp followers; singing their master’s tune for their daily supper, and jumping sinking political boats swifter than a rat!’ – Col RS Sidhu

Background

Recent news reports have emerged blaming failures for the collapse of Rajiv Gandhi’s Sri Lanka policy, on the army and intelligence, which ‘let him down’, even as the former prime minister persisted with what he believed was a necessary mission to preserve the island country and India’s integrity.

As per the report emerging in the media, attributed to a key policy advisor in the Rajiv Gandhi government, the 1987 accord and the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) were an effort to prevent the disintegration of Sri Lanka and avert a spillover that might have inflamed separatist sentiment in Tamil Nadu. The report faults shortcomings in planning and execution; and accused parts of the Indian establishment of misreading the ground; and misjudgements about key Tamil leaders and militant groups compounding the tragedy.

The military veterans of Operation Pawan welcome this opportunity to cross swords with one of the key advisors of then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, whose very role as an advisor, undefined and without any accountability for the advice rendered, reflects the malaise prevailing in the highest corridors of power in South Block.

The highest levels of governance had no institutionalised structures to make sense of the contradictory advice they actively sought from varied interested quarters, devise a coherent national policy, and issue unambiguous policy directions for achieving the laid down national aim.

Launch of Indian Army’s Military Operation Pawan

Operation Pawan was not a conventional military operation, but a politico-military mission undertaken by the Indian Army in Sri Lanka from July 1987 to March 1990, on lawful orders of the government of the day.

That it was launched without a well-defined aim should be evident to the cognizant from the rapid transformations, in quick succession, and in the nature of the mission. It was conceived as a coercive military operation in June, launched as a simple peacekeeping mission in July, and transformed to be executed as a peace enforcement task in October of the same year, that is 1987.

This changing national stance by the apex governance structure of the country, thrice within a time span of three months, bespeaks the true state of the indeterminate policy formulation process within the corridors of power.

The India Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) was signed by Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, and Julius Jayawardane, the then President of Sri Lanka, on 29 July 1987, and the Indian Army was tasked to commence the induction of the IPKF into Sri Lanka overnight. It is to the enduring credit of the Indian Army that they unflinchingly and successfully undertook this near impossible task.

Critique of the ISLA

The ISLA formed the basic legal document for the conduct of Operation Pawan, the code name for the conduct of military operations by the IPKF in Sri Lanka. It therefore warrants a look to understand the key vulnerabilities inbuilt into the ISLA.

The ISLA was structured on very weak foundations, as influential sections within the Sri Lanka Government (SLG), and the LTTE, the Tamil rebel group which mattered, were against the ISLA.

Even at home, the Indian government could not develop domestic political consensus on military intervention in Sri Lanka. This political division became even more pronounced once military operations began to disarm the LTTE. The government of the time also failed to prevent the LTTE from using sovereign Indian territory as a home base in its fight against the IPKF.

India also blundered in its strategic reading of the probable stance of LTTE towards the ISLA. The agreement promised greater autonomy and merger of Tamil majority North and East Provinces, within a broad democratic framework under the Sri Lanka constitution. But it fell far short of LTTE’s political aspirations of an independent Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka, the root cause of its hesitance to consent to the ISLA.

India failed to secure its own interests by letting the Indian military intervention be incumbent on request of SLG. It ended up dealing a key ace to the latter. The official request to the Indian government to withdraw the IPKF from Sri Lanka by the changed SLG in January 1989, now headed by Shri Premdasa the most vocal critic of the ISLA, left the former with no legal standing to deny the request.

Faced with mounting political opposition at home, and increasingly loud pronouncements from SLG for withdrawal of IPKF, the Indian state buckled under pressure and conceded to a premature deinduction of the IPKF from Sri Lanka. This deinduction agreement was arrived at in August of 1989, by the very Shri Rajiv Gandhi led government that had ordered the induction of IPKF in July 1987.

Once the IPKF was withdrawn, India was bereft of any decisive influence to oversee the continued adherence to the ISLA by the SLG.

The whole episode reeks of political failure, which the political and bureaucratic establishment, attempts to lay at the footsteps of the Indian Army.

Fact File: Operation Pawan

By September 1987, it was clear that the LTTE and the other Tamil militant groups were playing truant in surrendering their full cache of weapons and military equipment. The LTTE proclaimed its open opposition to the ISLA on October 6, 1987, and commenced hostilities against the IPKF, forcing the IPKF to launch peace enforcement military operations against the rebel organisation.

The IPKF did encounter initial operational setbacks, but by March 1988, after effecting major reorganisation in its counterinsurgency grid, the security situation was brought under control. The true measure of the success of the IPKF counterinsurgency operations is best measured by the IPKF ensuring its writ over the population centres within its mandated areas in Northeastern Sri Lanka, restoring blocked road and rail communication, civic amenities being made functional, and recommencement of trade and commerce activities by the public at large. All this was feasible due to the success achieved by the IPKF military operations in confining the LTTE to the remote jungles of Vavuniya, and the resultant breaking of the LTTE grip over the Tamil population.

By November 1988, IPKF had regained the upper hand not only in military operations but also succeeding in pushing through the political devolution provisions of the ISLA. The North – Eastern Provincial Council Elections were successfully conducted, referendum in Eastern Province for amalgamation with Northern province was accomplished, provincial administration was handed over to the Tamil political alliance that secured majority in the provincial elections, LTTE armed cadres had been confined to the Vanni jungles. Well-crafted and realistic institutional response for long term solution of the Tamil issue was also set into motion. These plans take time to mature.

On December 10, the GOC IPKF despatched his now famous signal to the Army Headquarters, ‘Mission accomplished, awaiting further orders.’ It was the perfect time to deinduct the IPKF from Sri Lanka. It is the failure by the Indian government, for reasons best known to it, in missing this opportunity that adversely impacted the subsequent course of Operation Pawan.

The succession of Premadasa as the President of Sri Lanka in January 1989, transformed the political situation in Colombo and New Delhi.

The changed political situation resulted in premature de-induction of IPKF from Sri Lanka and put paid to the efforts to pursue the political solution under its aegis. The rarely spoken informal alliance between the Premadasa-led Sri Lanka government and the LTTE to jointly combat the EPRLF led Tamil alliance after deinduction of IPKF, verifies the truth of this observation.

The IPKF had delivered; it was the failure of the Indian strategic establishment at New Delhi, which surrendered to regional satraps, that led to the premature withdrawal of the IPKF and unravelling of the ISLA.

It also served as the base point for failure of Operation Pawan being incorrectly laid at the door of IPKF. The bureaucracy and politicians came out looking clean!

A straightforward implementation of a political agreement, with a dormant military component between two sovereign states, resulted in the military component assuming the predominant role and is the biggest indictment of the ISLA. This is the clearest possible indicator of misinterpretation of relevant geopolitical factors.

The most important take away from Operation Pawan is the urgent need to establish formalized institutional structures and joint planning to secure national geopolitical interests through military means.

Meanwhile, most interestingly, neither of two signatory countries have abrogated the ISLA. It is alive, though in a state of suspended animation, awaiting its resurrection at an opportune moment?

Allegations: A Self-Inflicted Injury

The brutal truth of these unsubstantiated allegations against the Indian Army is that it is a self-inflicted injury, stemming from the wrongful denial of the legacy of Operation Pawan by the government of the day, to pursue its political interests in Tamil Nadu, and the Indarmy abdicating its solemn duty to honour the supreme sacrifices of its own soldiers. That this denial of honourable remembrance comes from a government with the strongest nationalist credentials is all the more hurtful.

There is no denying the military success of Operation Pawan, as evidenced from the facts discussed above. So where is the root of the narrative of Operation Pawan being a failure. It has to be squarely levelled at the doorstep of the Government.

The unstated official response, that it is ‘against the national interest’, and was a ‘minor operation’, does not cut ice any more. The very fact that the ISLA has not been abrogated by India and Sri Lanka, ipso facto, points to its continuing utility to the two countries. The SLG has demonstrated its gratitude by installing a prominent War Memorial in Colombo to honour the 1171 IPKF braves who made the supreme sacrifice during Operation Pawan. Indian dignitaries, led by the incumbent Prime Minister, Defence Minister, the Foreign Minister, and even the Service Chiefs have paid tribute at the IPKF War Memorial in Colombo. But they all are shy of commemorating Operation Pawan at the National War Memorial (NWM) at home in New Delhi. Only plausible answer is pursuit of political ends.

During Operation Pawan, 1171 soldiers were Killed In Action (KIA), near 3500 severely wounded, 1 PVC, 6 MVC, 98 VrC, more than three hundred gallantry awards, 32 months of duration of this military operation, participatory strength of nearly 100,000 troops at its peak, all belie the allegation of it being a minor operation.

That this denial has tacit support of the state is also borne out by the obduracy of the military hierarchy, charged with the responsibility to uphold the solemn covenant between the military and the state to honour the supreme sacrifices by its personnel, in not initiating meaningful redress of this grievance.

Despite all above actions and inactions of the military and political hierarchy, the Operation Pawan veterans hold no grudge against the organisation. It is for the organisation to ponder over their backing away from their solemn duty. The veterans on their part are resolved to tread the path of Dharma to ensure that the supreme sacrifice made by the men whom they led in battle are not forgotten.

About The Author

Analysing Allegations of Indian Army’s Responsibility in Rajiv Gandhi Government’s Sri Lanka Policy Failure 1987-90 - Indian Army, Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lanka Policy

 

Col RS Sidhu, Sena Medal is an ‘Operation ‘Pawan’ veteran, strategic thinker, author, avid practitioner of yoga and deep meditation, and is happiest undertaking offbeat adventure activities. His write-ups on strategic affairs are published in magazines and journals, and can also be accessed at his blogspot www.valleysandvalour.blogspot.com

 

DISCLAIMER: This article reflects author’s view point. Goa Chronicle may or may not subscribe to views of the author

Sonakshi Datta
Sonakshi Datta
Journalist who wants to cover the truth which others look the other way from.

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