Introduction: Why Farakka Still Matters
In South Asia, rivers are not just geographic features, they are strategic arteries, lifelines of food security, internal stability, and diplomatic leverage. Few agreements illustrate this better than the India–Bangladesh Farakka Water Treaty, signed in 1996, governing the sharing of Ganga waters at the Farakka Barrage.
Nearly three decades later, as the treaty approaches expiry in 2026, Farakka has re-emerged at the centre of regional geopolitics, climate stress, domestic politics, and strategic signalling between New Delhi and Dhaka. What was once framed as a technical water-sharing arrangement has evolved into a test of trust, balance of power, and cooperative security in eastern South Asia.
The Origins of Farakka: Engineering Meets Geopolitics
The roots of the Farakka issue lie in colonial-era river management and post-independence economic priorities. Commissioned in 1975, the Farakka Barrage was designed to divert water from the Ganga into the Hooghly River, preventing siltation and ensuring the operational viability of Kolkata Port.
For India, this was an economic necessity, the port was vital for eastern India’s trade and industrial base.
For Bangladesh (then East Pakistan, later independent in 1971), Farakka became a symbol of upstream vulnerability.
From the very beginning, Farakka was not merely about water volumes. It was about who controls the tap upstream.
From Dispute to Treaty: The 1996 Breakthrough
After two decades of interim arrangements, political mistrust, and diplomatic friction, India and Bangladesh finally signed the Ganga Water Sharing Treaty in December 1996, under:
India: Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda
Bangladesh: Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina
Key Provisions
- Duration: 30 years (1996–2026)
- Sharing Period: Lean season (1 January – 31 May)
- Mechanism: 10-day average flows at Farakka
- Assurance Clause: Mandatory consultation if flows fall below critical thresholds
The treaty was widely hailed as:
- A confidence-building measure
- Proof that India could act as a responsible upper riparian
- A template for resolving transboundary water disputes in South Asia
How the Sharing Formula Actually Works
Contrary to popular rhetoric, the treaty does not allow India to “cut off” water at will. When flows are 70,000 cusecs or more, sharing is roughly equal. When flows decline, Bangladesh is guaranteed a minimum share. During extreme scarcity, both governments are obligated to consult, not act unilaterally.
Importantly, the treaty applies only during the lean season. During the monsoon, the Ganga carries far more water than either country can practically use.
Why Bangladesh Still Feels Vulnerable
Despite the treaty, concerns persist in Bangladesh due to three structural realities:
(a) Geography
Bangladesh is a lower riparian state, with over 90% of its rivers originating outside its borders. Any upstream intervention, dams, barrages, diversions, creates anxiety.
(b) Domestic Politics
Farakka has often been used as a mobilising issue by opposition parties in Bangladesh, especially during election cycles, portraying India as an unfair hegemon.
(c) Climate Change
The treaty was designed based on historical flow assumptions. Today Himalayan glacial melt is becoming erratic, Dry seasons are longer and Monsoon floods are more intense.
This undermines old formulas and fuels demand for re-negotiation or stronger guarantees.
Strategic Implications for India
(a) Eastern Seaboard Security
Kolkata port is not just commercial, it supports Eastern India’s logistics, Inland waterways and Strategic depth for the Bay of Bengal region.
Any compromise that endangers Hooghly navigability would have economic and security consequences.
(b) India’s Image as a Regional Leader
India’s credibility as a net security provider in South Asia depends on Respecting treaties, Managing asymmetry responsibly and Avoiding coercive water diplomacy.
A stable Farakka regime reinforces India’s claim of being a rule-based regional power, especially when contrasted with China’s upstream behaviour on the Mekong and Brahmaputra.
(c) West Bengal Factor
Water sharing is politically sensitive within India itself. West Bengal’s agricultural and urban water needs mean New Delhi must balance external diplomacy with internal federal politics and Any renegotiation must carry state consensus.
Strategic Implications for Bangladesh
(a) Food & Human Security
Southwest Bangladesh depends on Ganga flows for Irrigation, Fisheries and Groundwater recharge
Reduced flows intensify Salinity intrusion, Crop stress and Rural migration
Thus, Farakka is directly linked to internal stability.
(b) Foreign Policy Leverage
Bangladesh uses water diplomacy to Extract concessions, Balance India while engaging China and Signal strategic autonomy.
The Farakka issue often surfaces alongside other negotiations—trade, transit, energy, and security cooperation.
Farakka in the Larger Regional Chessboard
(a) China Angle
China’s upstream control on the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) has made India acutely aware of what hydrological vulnerability feels like. This has subtly shifted India’s posture:
From rigid sovereignty To cooperative basin management
Ironically, China’s actions strengthen Bangladesh’s moral argument – but also India’s strategic caution.
(b) Indo-Pacific Context
As India deepens its role in the Indo-Pacific:
Stable neighbourhoods become critical
Water disputes cannot be allowed to fester
Farakka, therefore, is no longer a bilateral technical issue—it is part of India’s strategic environment management.
Treaty Expiry in 2026: What Lies Ahead?
Three broad scenarios are possible:
- Renewal with Minor Tweaks (Most Likely)
- Updated data sets
- Improved joint monitoring
- Climate-adjusted flow models
- Expanded Basin Framework
- Linking Farakka with Teesta and other rivers
- Creating a Ganga Basin Commission
- Shared flood forecasting & data transparency
- Politicised Breakdown (Least Desirable)
- Domestic pressures derail talks
- Water becomes a nationalist issue
- Trust deficit spills into other sectors
Strategically, both countries lose in scenario three.
Why Farakka Is Ultimately About Trust, Not Just Water
At its core, the Farakka Treaty represents India’s willingness to institutionalise restraint, Bangladesh’s effort to secure predictability and A rare example of long-term water diplomacy in a volatile region.
In an era of climate uncertainty, rising nationalism, and great-power competition, shared rivers will either become fault lines or force multipliers.
Conclusion: Flowing Forward, Not Backward
The Farakka Water Treaty has endured because it recognised a fundamental truth: rivers cannot be governed by power alone.
As we have entered into 2026, the challenge before India and Bangladesh is not merely to renew a treaty, but to future-proof cooperation, against climate shocks, political noise, and strategic miscalculations.
Handled wisely, Farakka can remain a model of mature neighbourhood diplomacy. Mishandled, it risks becoming another reminder that in South Asia, even water can turn political.
In geopolitics, as in rivers, blockages upstream eventually create turbulence downstream.
