When I wrote in Goa Chronicle about the emerging faultlines within Bangladesh, the argument was not alarmist. It was diagnostic. Bangladesh was not collapsing, but it was shifting. Beneath the surface of electoral arithmetic and political rhetoric, deeper structural pressures were visible: identity polarisation, economic vulnerability, institutional recalibration, and intensifying geopolitical competition in the Bay of Bengal.
Today, with Khalilur Rahman steering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the question is no longer whether those faultlines exist. They do. The more pressing question is whether Dhaka’s foreign policy can now function as the stabilising architecture that prevents those fractures from widening.
In Bangladesh’s case, foreign policy is not external strategy. It is domestic shock absorption.
I. The Continuity Imperative
Bangladesh’s geopolitical environment leaves little room for doctrinal swings. It is bordered on three sides by Bharat. It opens southward into the Bay of Bengal, now an increasingly contested maritime theatre. It is deeply tied to Western export markets, heavily reliant on Gulf remittances, and substantially financed by Chinese infrastructure investments.
Any abrupt foreign policy pivot risks economic or security destabilisation.
The appointment of Khalilur Rahman, a seasoned diplomat with multilateral credentials, signals institutional continuity rather than ideological experimentation. Unlike mass-politics figures who mobilise sentiment, Rahman represents bureaucratic steadiness. That choice is telling.
Dhaka appears to be prioritising predictability at a moment when unpredictability would magnify internal stress.
II. Revisiting the Identity Faultline
In the earlier Goa Chronicle analysis, identity was identified as a primary fracture: the tension between secular Bengali nationalism and Islamist mobilisation. This faultline is not new, but it has intensified in tone and symbolism.
Foreign policy often becomes a theatre for managing identity contradictions.
Under Rahman, Bangladesh is unlikely to adopt overtly ideological international postures. Engagement with Western democracies will remain active, particularly to protect export access and democratic credibility. Simultaneously, calibrated rhetoric toward the Islamic world will maintain domestic equilibrium.
In effect, foreign policy becomes a balancing act between secular projection and religious sensitivity. It is a diplomatic tightrope, and Dhaka has walked it before.
The difference now lies in the intensity of domestic scrutiny. Every external gesture carries internal resonance.
III. The Economic Faultline: Markets as Geopolitics
Bangladesh’s economic growth story has been impressive. Yet it remains structurally exposed. The garment industry depends on European and American markets. Remittances from Gulf states stabilise currency reserves. Infrastructure expansion has relied significantly on Chinese financing.
In the faultlines article, I had argued that economic exposure can quickly transform into geopolitical leverage. That warning remains valid.
Rahman’s doctrine appears to mitigate this risk through diversification rather than defiance. Engagement with the United States and the European Union is likely to deepen, not as alignment, but as insurance. Labour rights compliance, democratic signalling, and climate finance negotiations will remain central.
Simultaneously, Chinese projects will continue, though possibly with enhanced scrutiny regarding debt sustainability and long-term viability.
Dhaka’s approach is neither anti-China nor anti-West. It is anti-dependency.
IV. The Bharat–China Equation: Managing Proximity
Geography ensures that Bangladesh cannot escape the gravitational pull of Bharat. Economic interdependence, transit corridors, security coordination, and shared river systems bind the two states in ways that cannot be theatrically undone.
At the same time, Chinese infrastructure investment and defence supplies have embedded Beijing into Bangladesh’s strategic landscape.
In the earlier faultlines piece, I warned that mishandling this dual engagement could convert Bangladesh into a Bay of Bengal pressure point.
Under Rahman, the likely strategy is subtle containment of that risk.
Security cooperation with Bharat will quietly continue. Intelligence coordination and border management will remain intact. Connectivity projects are too mutually beneficial to disrupt.
Yet Dhaka may seek symbolic parity in negotiations, particularly over water sharing and economic concessions. Tone may sharpen occasionally, but rupture remains unlikely.
With China, infrastructure cooperation will persist. However, Bangladesh will avoid overt strategic optics, particularly any signalling that suggests naval alignment or basing accommodation.
Dhaka seeks benefit from both Delhi and Beijing without becoming subordinate to either.
That is strategic hedging at its most disciplined.
V. The Rohingya Burden: Humanitarian Pressure, Diplomatic Instrument
The Rohingya crisis remains both a humanitarian responsibility and a geopolitical card. Bangladesh shoulders enormous social and economic strain in hosting displaced populations from Myanmar.
Rahman’s experience with this issue gives Dhaka continuity. The strategy will likely involve sustained multilateral engagement, keeping the crisis visible at the United Nations and among donor states, without unilateral escalation.
The objective is burden-sharing, not brinkmanship.
In the earlier faultline analysis, I cautioned that prolonged refugee stagnation could become an internal destabiliser. That risk remains. Foreign policy here becomes a pressure management mechanism, seeking international funding and diplomatic leverage to offset domestic fatigue.
VI. Institutional Balance: The Civil–Military Interface
Bangladesh’s political evolution has often been shaped by institutional recalibration between civilian authority and military influence. During moments of political turbulence, foreign policy can become either centralised or professionalised.
The elevation of a career diplomat suggests professionalisation.
This does not eliminate internal contestation. But it does reduce volatility in external messaging. Predictable diplomacy reassures neighbours and markets alike.
In a region where sudden shifts can trigger cascading reactions, steadiness is strategic capital.
VII. Implications for Bharat: Beyond Alarmism
From Bharat’s perspective, the narrative must avoid extremes. Bangladesh is neither pivoting away nor aligning against.
The prudent course for New Delhi lies in deepening economic interdependence and expediting infrastructure commitments. Connectivity projects linking India’s Northeast through Bangladesh remain mutually beneficial. Energy trade and digital cooperation can further bind structural interests.
Public rhetorical escalation would only inflame nationalist sentiment across the border and widen the very faultlines that both states have worked to contain.
Strategic patience is not passivity. It is calibrated engagement.
VIII. The Bay of Bengal as Theatre of Stability
The Bay of Bengal is emerging as one of the most consequential maritime theatres of the Indo-Pacific. Naval presence, submarine routes, energy corridors, and shipping lanes intersect here.
Bangladesh’s foreign policy under Rahman appears designed to prevent its coastline from becoming an arena of contestation.
Participatory engagement in maritime security initiatives, without formal bloc membership, allows Dhaka to remain relevant without provoking strategic backlash.
The doctrine can be summarised thus: visible cooperation, invisible caution.
IX. From Faultlines to Framework
The original faultlines analysis highlighted the risk of Bangladesh becoming internally fragmented and externally pressured. The current phase suggests an attempt to build diplomatic scaffolding across those cracks.
Foreign policy becomes not an arena of assertion but of insulation.
Bangladesh is not choosing sides. It is choosing equilibrium.
In an age when middle powers are compelled to navigate superpower rivalry, Dhaka appears to be refining a doctrine of calibrated autonomy.
Stability first. Leverage carefully. Align with none.
If that balance holds, Bangladesh may emerge not as a rupture point in the Bay of Bengal, but as a stabilising hinge between competing powers.
If it falters, the internal faultlines identified earlier could widen under external strain.
The coming years will test whether disciplined diplomacy can outpace domestic volatility.
For now, Dhaka seems to have chosen the quieter path, the path of balance over bravado.
And in geopolitics, quiet balance often outlasts loud alignment.
