As South Asia navigates its complex geopolitical waters, recent developments in the Maldives have sparked concerns about a growing Chinese influence in the region. With the election of Mohamed Muizzu, who is perceived by many as a pro-China figure, the question arises: Could Sri Lanka, facing its own political and economic challenges, follow a similar path and potentially end up under the sway of Chinese interests?
The Maldives, a strategically located archipelago, elected Mohamed Muizzu in September 2023. Muizzu’s party, the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), has a history of aligning with China, particularly during the tenure of former President Abdulla Yameen. Under Yameen, the Maldives signed significant infrastructure projects with Beijing, most notably through China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These deals came with large loans that fueled fears of a “debt trap,” a pattern seen in other developing nations across Asia and Africa.
Muizzu’s election is seen as a potential pivot back to China after the Maldives’ previous administration leaned toward India under the ‘India First’ policy. With Muizzu in power, China is poised to regain its foothold in the Maldives, bringing the small island nation into its sphere of influence. This development has sent ripples through South Asia, especially in neighboring Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka, like the Maldives, holds strategic importance in the Indian Ocean, making it a key focus for global powers. Over the past decade, Sri Lanka’s economic and political relationship with China has deepened, particularly during the presidencies of Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa. China’s funding of large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the Hambantota Port and the Colombo Port City, was a boon to Sri Lanka during periods of economic growth but has since become a burden as the country grapples with the weight of its debts.
The Hambantota Port, a prime example, was handed over to a Chinese state-owned company on a 99-year lease after Sri Lanka failed to repay the loans. This has fueled fears of Chinese “debt diplomacy,” where countries, unable to meet their debt obligations, are forced to cede control of key infrastructure to Beijing. Sri Lanka’s economic crisis, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and political mismanagement, has made it more vulnerable to foreign influence, particularly from China.
The downfall of Gotabaya Rajapaksa in 2022, triggered by massive protests against economic mismanagement, led to Ranil Wickremesinghe assuming the presidency. Wickremesinghe has sought to balance Sri Lanka’s foreign relations, particularly by securing assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and strengthening ties with India and the West. While Wickremesinghe has maintained relations with China, his government has been more cautious about further increasing Sri Lanka’s debt to Beijing.
However, as Sri Lanka moves towards potential elections in 2024, the possibility of a return to power by pro-China factions looms large with AK Dissanayake appearing to be creating a wave as Sri Lanka goes into Presidential polls later this week. Should a pro-China candidate rise to power, Sri Lanka may follow a trajectory similar to that of the Maldives under Muizzu.
India, the regional power, views the growing Chinese presence in Sri Lanka and the Maldives with concern. New Delhi has long been wary of China’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean, especially with projects like the Hambantota Port, which India fears could be used for military purposes. The Maldives under Muizzu and Sri Lanka with a potential pro-China government would significantly alter the region’s balance of power.
India has sought to counter China’s influence through its ‘Neighborhood First’ policy, providing aid and diplomatic support to Sri Lanka during its economic crisis. However, China’s ability to offer large-scale infrastructure investments, coupled with its strategic patience, makes it a formidable rival.
The election of Muizzu in the Maldives serves as a warning sign for Sri Lanka. While Sri Lanka’s current leadership has shown a preference for a more balanced foreign policy, its deep economic troubles make it susceptible to external influence. China, with its vast financial resources and strategic interests, remains a key player.
Should a pro-China candidate gain power in Sri Lanka, the nation could become more dependent on Beijing, further entangling itself in China’s geopolitical ambitions. The result could be a Sri Lanka that, like the Maldives, drifts closer to China, risking its sovereignty and regional alliances in exchange for short-term economic relief.
Sri Lanka, standing at a critical juncture, must navigate its future carefully. The rise of Mohamed Muizzu in the Maldives underscores the growing influence of China in South Asia. While Sri Lanka’s current leadership has resisted becoming overly reliant on Beijing, its political and economic volatility creates the risk of a shift towards a more China-dependent government. As the region’s geopolitical dynamics evolve, the question remains: Will Sri Lanka get its own ‘Muizzu’—a leader who pulls the nation deeper into China’s orbit? Only time, and the outcome of the next elections, will tell.
