The Middle East remains a cauldron of tension and conflict, especially after the events of October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched a brutal and unprecedented attack on Israel, targeting civilians in a manner that shocked the world. In response, Israel not only retaliated with force against Hamas in Gaza but also escalated strikes against Hezbollah positions in Lebanon and extended its operations to target Iranian assets linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iran’s recent strike on Israel has intensified the regional conflict, drawing the Islamic Republic into a more direct confrontation, but true to form, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei still refrains from an all-out war.
Following Israel’s swift and effective retaliation, which included targeted strikes that eliminated key figures within Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran’s Supreme Leader finds himself in a precarious position. Despite Tehran’s ongoing rhetoric, the fact remains that Khamenei continues to leverage his proxies for attacks while avoiding direct engagement with the Israeli military. Even as Tehran struck back, it largely remained cautious about crossing thresholds that would bring the full might of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) upon Iran itself.
The war after October 7 demonstrated Israel’s determination to eradicate the top leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah, organizations that Iran has long sponsored as part of its broader regional strategy. The killing of several senior commanders of both groups not only dealt a blow to their operational capabilities but also sent a clear signal to Tehran. These targeted eliminations show Israel’s ability to penetrate deep into enemy networks and eliminate threats with precision, despite the chaotic situation on multiple fronts. Iran’s reluctance to escalate further after these hits illustrates the reality that Khamenei understands all too well: a direct war with Israel could reduce parts of Iran to rubble.
For decades, Iran has equipped and trained groups like Hamas and Hezbollah to fight its battles against Israel, allowing the regime to export its revolutionary ideology while avoiding the devastating consequences of direct war. Even now, as Israel responds forcefully to attacks, Iran opts to escalate primarily through its proxies rather than confronting Israel head-on. The reason for this is clear: Iran’s conventional military forces, although large, lack the technological sophistication and strategic depth required to win a direct conflict against Israel, which is supported by state-of-the-art defense systems and one of the most capable militaries in the world.
Khamenei’s reliance on indirect warfare reflects his fear of a full-scale military confrontation that could cripple the regime economically and politically. Despite his fiery speeches that denounce Israel and pledge support for “the liberation of Palestine,” the Iranian leadership has consistently sought to avoid a conflict that could threaten the Islamic Republic’s survival. This strategic caution was apparent even during the heightened tensions following Israel’s recent strikes on Iranian-linked facilities in Syria and Lebanon, which served as retaliation for Hezbollah’s attacks from the north.
The aftermath of October 7 has not only changed the battlefield but also the calculus for Khamenei, whose war-by-proxy approach is now facing unprecedented challenges. As Israel systematically dismantles Hamas’s command structure in Gaza and targets Hezbollah’s operatives in Lebanon, Iran’s proxies are feeling the heat like never before. Yet, even as Khamenei encourages his proxies to keep the pressure on, Tehran calls upon international actors to mediate and prevent further escalation. This underscores a telling contradiction: while Iran supports its allies in escalating violence against Israel, it simultaneously seeks to avoid crossing the line that would provoke a crushing Israeli response directly against Iran.
By avoiding direct conflict and relying on proxies, Khamenei demonstrates not only his regime’s strategic calculation but also its limitations. Iran’s strikes may serve as a symbolic act of defiance, but they are far from a declaration of open war, especially when weighed against the devastating losses inflicted upon Hamas and Hezbollah leadership. This pattern reinforces the reality that Khamenei’s Iran is unwilling to fight a war it cannot win. The strikes that do occur are aimed at maintaining face and satisfying hardliners at home rather than achieving any meaningful military objectives.
The Iranian regime’s fear is not unfounded. The IDF has shown that it can, with swift and targeted operations, take out high-value targets without getting bogged down in prolonged conflict. Should Israel decide to extend its campaign to Iranian territory itself, it would not be limited to striking military bases but could also target critical infrastructure, dealing a severe blow to the already embattled Iranian economy. Khamenei’s avoidance of this scenario reveals a fundamental truth about his regime: it is more bark than bite.
Ultimately, Khamenei remains a “dog that barks,” projecting an image of resistance and strength while seeking to avoid the harsh reality of a direct war with Israel. His regime’s actions speak louder than its words; as Israel eliminates key figures within Hamas and Hezbollah and strikes Iranian assets, Iran’s calls for restraint become louder, not its retaliatory actions. This conflict may drag on, but one thing is clear: Khamenei will do everything to ensure that the war remains limited to his proxies, avoiding at all costs a fight that could lead to the destruction of Iran’s warfighting capabilities and a humiliating collapse of the Islamic Republic’s power.
