As Ankara expands its military and economic footprint in Somalia and Beijing pursues its strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland is increasingly looking towards India as a natural partner. New Delhi must recognise that the geopolitical contest unfolding along the Gulf of Aden is not merely about African politics. It is about the future balance of power in the Indian Ocean.
The Horn of Africa is emerging as one of the most consequential geopolitical theatres of the twenty-first century. What was once viewed primarily through the lens of piracy, terrorism, humanitarian crises and political instability has become an arena where regional and global powers are competing for influence over strategic maritime routes, military access, natural resources and political relationships.
Two countries whose expanding presence deserves India’s particular attention are Turkey and China.
Both have invested considerable diplomatic and strategic capital in Somalia. Both support Mogadishu’s territorial integrity and oppose Somaliland’s claim to independent sovereignty. Yet their interests extend beyond the question of Somali unity.
Turkey sees Somalia as a gateway to expanding its influence across Africa and the Indian Ocean. China views the region through the wider prism of maritime security, economic connectivity, diplomatic influence and its competition with Taiwan.
Caught between these ambitions is Somaliland, a territory that restored its claim to independence in 1991 and has since developed its own governing institutions, security structures and political identity.
What makes this geopolitical equation particularly interesting is Somaliland’s growing interest in India.
While Turkey and China are consolidating their relationships with Mogadishu, Somaliland is signalling that it sees New Delhi as a potentially important partner in its political and economic future.
India would be making a strategic mistake if it failed to understand the significance of that opportunity.
Turkey’s Growing Military Ambitions in Somalia
Turkey’s involvement in Somalia did not begin with military ambitions. Ankara initially established its influence through humanitarian assistance, infrastructure development and diplomatic engagement, particularly following the devastating famine of 2011.
Over time, however, that humanitarian relationship evolved into a comprehensive strategic partnership.
Today, Turkey operates the TURKSOM military training facility in Mogadishu, which opened in 2017 and has trained thousands of Somali military personnel. Turkish assistance includes military training, counterterrorism cooperation, defence equipment and institutional capacity-building.
The relationship has become increasingly significant. On November 11, 2026, reports confirmed fresh discussions between Turkish and Somali officials on expanding military and security cooperation.
But military training is only one dimension of Ankara’s ambitions.
Turkey has also secured agreements covering offshore petroleum exploration, maritime security and fisheries governance. Its state-owned petroleum company has exploration rights in three offshore blocks, while a Turkish military-linked investment institution has acquired a significant role in Somalia’s fisheries administration.
This brings us to a development that should concern Indian strategic planners.
Turkey is developing a space launch facility on Somalia’s Indian Ocean coastline. Although presented as a civilian space programme, reports based on Turkish government documents and parliamentary testimony indicate potential applications for long-range missile testing.
A November 9, 2026 investigation reported that the Turkish Space Agency had allocated approximately 2.1 billion Turkish lira, equivalent to $42 million, for transfer to Turkey’s Defence Industry Support Fund under its national space-access programme. The reported financial connection raises legitimate questions about the project’s dual-use potential, although it does not establish that the entire allocation is being spent on missile infrastructure.
India must assess these developments carefully.
A Turkish military and technological presence on the African coast of the Indian Ocean does not automatically constitute a threat to India. Turkey is not China’s military ally, and the two countries pursue distinct geopolitical agendas.
Nevertheless, any expansion of foreign military capabilities near important Indian Ocean shipping routes warrants serious strategic attention.
The question is no longer simply what Turkey is doing in Somalia.
The question is what Turkey’s growing military, maritime and economic influence could mean for the future balance of power across the western Indian Ocean.
China’s Somalia Strategy: Somaliland and the Taiwan Question
China’s approach to Somalia is different from Turkey’s, but no less consequential.
Beijing’s primary interests include protecting its diplomatic influence, expanding commercial relationships, securing maritime access and limiting Taiwan’s international partnerships.
Somalia has consistently supported Beijing’s One China position. In return, China has strongly defended Somalia’s territorial integrity, including its claim over Somaliland.
For China, Somaliland presents a particular diplomatic challenge.
In 2020, Somaliland and Taiwan established representative offices in each other’s capitals. Their relationship has subsequently expanded into development, technical and diplomatic cooperation.
In June 2026, Somaliland opened a new representative office in Taiwan, reaffirming its determination to pursue independent international relationships despite objections from Beijing and Mogadishu.
This relationship carries implications beyond symbolic diplomacy.
Somaliland has demonstrated that it is willing to maintain a partnership with Taiwan even when doing so complicates its relations with one of the world’s most powerful countries.
China has responded by strengthening its opposition to Somaliland’s recognition.
On October 23, 2026, China and Djibouti issued a joint statement reaffirming Somalia’s territorial integrity, rejecting Somaliland’s recognition and opposing Somaliland’s cooperation with Taiwan. aa.com.tr
The significance of this development should not be underestimated.
China already maintains a military support base in neighbouring Djibouti. Its economic and security interests extend across the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean.
Somaliland’s coastline, particularly the port of Berbera and its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb maritime corridor, occupies an important position in this strategic geography.
For Beijing, the Somaliland question therefore intersects with three considerations: Somalia’s territorial claims, China’s competition with Taiwan, and its broader regional influence.
For Somaliland, the challenge is equally clear. How does a relatively small territory defend its political autonomy and economic interests while facing opposition from a major global power?
One possible answer lies in diversifying its international relationships. And that is where India enters the equation.
Somaliland: A Nation Seeking Partners, Not Patrons
I recently had the opportunity to visit Somaliland and engage with its leadership, including President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, popularly known as Irro.
My discussions reinforced an important impression: Somaliland’s leadership is not merely seeking diplomatic recognition. It is looking for meaningful economic partnerships, international investment, technological cooperation and opportunities for its young population.
There is a strong desire to transform Somaliland from a territory struggling for international acceptance into an economically productive and strategically relevant nation. Its leadership understands the importance of geography.
Somaliland occupies a valuable position along the Gulf of Aden, with access to maritime routes connecting the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
Its opportunities extend across ports, logistics, energy exploration, fisheries, renewable energy, healthcare, education, digital infrastructure and industrial development. But geography alone cannot transform an economy. Somaliland needs capital, technology, institutional expertise and international partnerships.
What I found particularly encouraging was the interest in developing closer relationships with India. India is viewed as a country with considerable expertise in healthcare, pharmaceuticals, education, information technology, infrastructure, entrepreneurship and affordable technological solutions. There is also an appreciation for India’s historical connections with the wider Horn of Africa.
In my assessment, Somaliland sees India not simply as another foreign power but as a potential partner in its long-term development. This distinction matters.
Somaliland does not need to become a battleground between China, Turkey and India. It needs the freedom to develop relationships that serve the aspirations of its people.
India can contribute to that aspiration without reproducing the geopolitical rivalries that have complicated the development of other regions.
Why Somaliland Matters to India’s Indian Ocean Strategy
India’s strategic community has traditionally concentrated much of its attention on the eastern Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca and China’s activities in South Asia.
However, the western Indian Ocean is becoming equally important.
The Gulf of Aden connects Indian maritime commerce to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Disruptions along these routes can affect India’s trade, energy security and commercial interests.
Somaliland’s location makes it relevant to this maritime equation.
The ports of Berbera, Zeila, Bulhar and Lughaya offer different possibilities for future commercial and infrastructure development, although their operational readiness and investment requirements vary substantially.
For India, the opportunities could include commercial port participation, maritime logistics, energy exploration, telecommunications, healthcare, educational partnerships and industrial infrastructure.
There is also a longer-term strategic consideration.
India’s SAGAR vision and its wider approach to maritime security emphasise cooperative security, regional development and respect for the interests of partner countries.
Somaliland could eventually become a meaningful participant in this framework, subject to diplomatic and legal considerations.
India should also recognise that commercial engagement and diplomatic recognition are separate questions.
New Delhi has maintained longstanding relations with Somalia and publicly reaffirmed its respect for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in January 2026. That position creates diplomatic complexities which cannot simply be ignored.
However, it should not prevent India from studying Somaliland’s economic potential, expanding people-to-people relationships or examining legally viable forms of cooperation. India’s strategic interests require both diplomatic prudence and geopolitical foresight.
Turkey and China Have Different Objectives, but Somaliland Faces a Common Challenge
It would be inaccurate to suggest that Turkey and China are operating a coordinated strategy against Somaliland. They are not.
Turkey’s relationship with Somalia is driven substantially by defence cooperation, economic opportunities, maritime influence and its ambition to establish itself as an important power in Africa. China’s position is shaped by its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, its opposition to Taiwan’s diplomatic engagement and its wider economic and security interests. Yet both countries’ positions have consequences for Somaliland.
Both oppose its independent sovereignty, and both maintain relationships with Mogadishu that strengthen Somalia’s international standing. The practical result is that Somaliland faces significant external diplomatic pressure while attempting to build its own economic future.
There is another important dimension.
Somaliland’s relative institutional continuity since 1991 deserves greater international attention. Its experience has not been without political tensions, territorial disputes or governance challenges. Nevertheless, it has developed functioning institutions and demonstrated an ability to sustain a substantial degree of self-government. That experience merits serious examination rather than automatic dismissal.
The international community cannot indefinitely discuss Somaliland solely through the political preferences of Mogadishu without examining the historical, legal and democratic arguments advanced by Somalilanders themselves.
The African Union, in particular, should engage these arguments with greater intellectual and institutional openness.
India Must Not Allow Strategic Opportunities to Pass Unnoticed
India does not need to confront Turkey or China over Somaliland. Nor should New Delhi approach Somaliland as a geopolitical instrument to be deployed against Beijing or Ankara. Such an approach would undermine the very partnership India should seek to build.
Instead, India should adopt a constructive, phased strategy. The immediate priority should be commercial and developmental engagement.
Indian companies possess considerable capabilities in port management, energy services, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, agriculture, renewable energy, technology and vocational education. These are precisely the sectors that could help Somaliland generate employment, develop its infrastructure and strengthen its economy.
Healthcare deserves particular attention. Somaliland patients seeking specialised treatment abroad face logistical and financial challenges. India, with its established medical institutions and comparatively affordable healthcare, could become an important destination for Somaliland patients. A more efficient medical travel framework, alongside hospital partnerships and training programmes, would provide tangible humanitarian benefits.
Similarly, Indian universities and technical institutions could help develop Somaliland’s future workforce. Technology partnerships could support digital governance, public services, entrepreneurship and industrial development.
Commercial port investments could strengthen regional trade connectivity, provided projects are commercially viable and legally structured.
These initiatives would build relationships through practical outcomes rather than geopolitical rhetoric. Over time, India could consider more formal mechanisms of engagement consistent with its broader diplomatic interests.
The question of recognition deserves a serious and independent Indian assessment, informed by international law, Somaliland’s history, regional stability and India’s long-term strategic interests.
I personally believe India should recognise Somaliland’s sovereignty. But I also recognise that such a decision requires careful diplomatic preparation. Recognition should be the outcome of a considered national strategy, not an impulsive reaction to the activities of other countries.
The Larger Contest Is About Influence Over the Future
There is a tendency to view the Horn of Africa as a peripheral region. That perception is outdated.
The region sits at the intersection of African economic development, Middle Eastern security, Indian Ocean trade and the strategic ambitions of major powers. Turkey understands this. China understands this. The Gulf states understand this. India must understand it too.
The emergence of Somaliland as a potential economic and strategic partner presents an opportunity for New Delhi to deepen its presence in a region whose importance will only increase. It is also an opportunity to demonstrate a different model of international partnership.
India can engage Somaliland through mutual respect, technology transfer, investment, institutional development and people-to-people cooperation. Such engagement need not come at the expense of India’s relations with Somalia.
Indeed, a carefully designed Indian approach could contribute to wider regional prosperity and stability.
Somaliland Is Extending Its Hand. Will India Respond?
The geopolitical reality is becoming increasingly evident.
Turkey is strengthening its military and economic influence in Somalia. China is consolidating its diplomatic position while opposing Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan and its aspirations for international recognition.
Somaliland, meanwhile, is looking beyond its immediate neighbourhood for partners willing to understand its aspirations and contribute to its development.
India has an opportunity to be one of those partners.
My interactions in Somaliland convinced me that there is genuine interest in building a meaningful relationship with India. I believe that interest should be reciprocated through serious diplomatic consideration and practical economic engagement.
India does not have to compete with Turkey or China on their terms. It must act according to its own strategic interests and the principles that have guided its international relationships.
The future of the Horn of Africa will not be determined by military bases and diplomatic declarations alone. It will also be shaped by which countries help create sustainable economic opportunities, strengthen institutions and improve the lives of ordinary people.
Somaliland is extending its hand towards India. The question is whether New Delhi will recognise the strategic value of that gesture before others determine the geopolitical future of the region.
